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1. Habermasian discourse ethics 
This paper is intended to show that Germany’s political system, which is 
consensual in nature, has had a strong impact on climate change related 
policy outcomes both within Germany and in its aims in international rela-
tions. The consensual imperative of both Germany’s political system and 
international relations make it appropriate to utilise Jürgen Habermas’ 
work on discourse ethics to aid analysis. It is further argued that discourse 
ethics would provide an appropriate framework to implement international 
policy-making.  
Discourse ethics requires that all affected parties have the opportunity 
to contribute to the discussion, that contributions are listened to, and that 
decisions are made through rational choice, i.e. that the force of the better 
argument prevails. In this way, democratic will formation can be achieved. 
Through such discursive processes agreement can be reached to formu-
late a system of rights and duties. Although Habermas details the process 
through which universal norms can be determined, it is not the case that 
such norms are always achievable, as not all interests are generalisable. 
The main point is that ethical discourse be engaged in and that where a 
universal norm is not achievable, a consensually agreed upon compro-
mise should be reached. 
Compromise requires changing actions, whilst consensus can imply 
changing cognitions, interest patterns and options for actions. Although 
Habermas details ideal discursive processes, he does recognise that hu-
mans can act in a goal oriented manner. As Stokke (1998:135) points out, 
Habermas holds that such actions cannot be reduced solely to strategic 
concerns, but that values and social norms also feed into the decision 
making process. 
From a Habermasian point of view one might expect German climate 
change related policies to be the result of rational decision-making arrived 
at through discourse that includes a multiplicity of inputs and considera-
tions.  
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2. Germany 
Following the Second World War the German political system was com-
pletely overhauled. Diffusion of power was a prime objective and this re-
sulted in a system which requires multi-participation and consensual pol-
icy-making. International relations are conducted in a discursive manner 
that aims to lead to consensus. Participants in the political system include 
the Länder, i.e. regions that constitute the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The Länder introduce some laws but they implement those made by both 
themselves and the Federal Government. Implementation is clearly an 
important factor and can obviously be effected with more or less vigour. 
Representatives of the Länder constitute the Bundesrat, the upper house 
of parliament.  
Political parties also play a major role in the German political system. 
Article 21 of the Basic Law states that ‘political parties shall participate in 
the formation of the political will of the people’. The main political parties, 
the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) have consciously defined themselves 
as mass organisations, with relatively large memberships and broad elec-
toral bases, which bridge traditional electoral cleavages, especially class 
and religion. Precisely because of their broad appeal, the Volksparteien 
[peoples’ parties] must reconcile a wide range of interests within their 
ranks (Green & Paterson, 2005:5). 
Germany’s electoral system is based on proportional representation. 
A second party list allows for people to express a preference for, in effect, 
the party that they wish to be in coalition with their main preference party. 
This system has resulted in coalition governments for all but four years 
since 1949. These characteristics allow for minority groups to have atten-
tion paid to their concerns. However, before gaining representation a po-
litical party must receive at least 5% of votes; this it is argued limits the 
number of ‘effective’ parties within the party system, and isolates extreme 
Right- and Left-wing parties (Lees, 2005:21). 
The judiciary also plays an important part in German governance. 
Germany has a written constitution that allows for a programmatic state-
ment of general principles which are seen as an essential prologue to leg-
islation and policy development, a tendency that is probably reinforced by 
2 
the practice of coalition government in which political parties of different 
ideological persuasions have to come to some agreement on the running 
of government. Moreover, the emphasis upon constitutionalism in the con-
duct of government also has the effect of making the policy process more 
formal (Weale, 1992:81-82).  
A statement of environmental principles (precautionary principle, pol-
luter-pays and industry-government cooperation) was made as early as 
1971. These principles, it seems, have effectively been institutionalised 
within the German policy-making system.  
Proportional representation and coalition government enables small 
groups to be heard. When environmental issues, including climate change, 
became fairly widespread concerns, the Green Party gained support. This 
had the effect not only of the Green Party gaining, in the first instance 
Länder government places and later Federal Government positions, but 
also forcing the main parties to take on board environmental issues. The 
adoption of people’s ideas and concerns by the main political parties was 
a result of the political system that facilitates such inclusiveness.  
In addition to federalism and political parties, Katzenstein (1987) iden-
tifies parapublic institutions as being a part of the policy-making process. 
In the environmental field such institutions include the Council of Environ-
mental Experts (SRU), the German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU), and the Council for Sustainable Development (RNE). Academic 
research institutes and non-governmental organisations may also be in-
cluded, as input of parapublic institutions to the consensual political sys-
tem (see Lees, 2005). 
The political features as described above create a situation in which 
consensual politics can flourish. This propensity for multi-participatory and 
consensual politics has allowed the ideas and concerns of various sectors 
of the community to be considered in the development of climate change 
related environmental politics and policies.  
Forests are important in German mythology, and it appears that in-
herent in German culture is the idea of forests being permanent features 
of the environment. Beuermann & Burdick (1997) point out that nach-
haltige Forstwirtschaft (sustainable forestry) was an aim as long ago as 
the turn of the 19th century. It is therefore not surprising that one issue 
that engendered popular concern was the widespread discovery in the 
early 1980s of Waldsterben (dying forests); the cause was attributed to air 
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pollution. Von Weizsäcker states that all of a sudden, the public was up in 
arms again. The forests, the home of German myths and fairy tales were 
dying (von Weizsäcker, 1994:20). 
Beuermann & Burdick argue that due to this entrenched association 
with forests, during the 1980s and 1990s tropical deforestation and climate 
change1 were predominant in German thinking in relation to the concept of 
sustainability.  
Weale states that ‘the sudden upsurge in public concern over issues 
of forest death and damage’ (Weale, 1992:1) in 1982, caused the German 
government to change from a ‘cautious stance on the environment’ (ibid) 
to a more proactive one. It would, however, be incorrect to think that envi-
ronmental issues were not addressed prior to this date. Von Weizsäcker 
notes that following his election in late 1969, Willy Brandt was the first 
Federal Chancellor to give high priority to environmental protection in a 
government programme (von Weizsäcker, 1994:21). 
In October 1971, a Federal Environment Programme was adopted 
which entailed the passing of eighteen major environmental laws over the 
subsequent five years. This was Germany’s first Environment Programme. 
Cavender and Jäger explain that the programme was based on three prin-
ciples – Vorsorge (precautionary measures), Polluter Pays, and Industry-
Government Cooperation - the philosophical underpinnings that have 
guided all subsequent environmental policies (Cavender & Jäger, 1993:7). 
Precautionary measures are indicative of considerations of intergenera-
tional justice. 
The polluter pays principle demands that the originators of the prob-
lem pay to resolve it. This, Paterson (2001) argues, is a form of retributive 
justice. Retributive justice can be seen as taking responsibility for distribu-
tive injustices and making amends for them. 
Participatory justice (which is in effect what Habermas’ discourse eth-
ics demands) enables ideas to be heard and acted upon, thus enabling 
policies to be perceived as being just, resulting in acceptance of such poli-
cies, which enhances their potential for success. Industry-government co-
operation can be seen as a part of this process. 
                                                 
1  The public became aware of massive tropical deforestation and the fact that forests 
act as ‘carbon sinks’, that is they take in carbon dioxide and give off oxygen. Car-
bon dioxide (CO2) is a major contributor towards global warming and climate 
change. 
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Both the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle have 
been adopted by the international climate change regime (at least they are 
included in documentation if not properly implemented) since they were 
introduced in Germany. It can be argued that this transmission of ideas 
has been achieved through what Habermas terms communicative rational-
ity. In other words, the better argument has prevailed, resulting in the 
above principles entering into international environmental discourse.  
Returning to German politics, the Council of Environmental Experts 
(SRU) was convened in 1972, and in 1974 the Federal Environment 
Agency (UBA) was created to research requirements for possible regula-
tions.  
By 1975 the global oil price increase was biting, both economically 
and in fears of worsening unemployment and continued fuel cost rises. 
This had the effect of industrial leaders putting pressure on the govern-
ment not to apportion further costs to industry in the form of environmental 
regulations. It is also the case that the Länder and communities were 
made to take on environmental administration; emissions standards re-
garding the protection of water were also introduced. Rowlands (1995) 
points out that during the oil crisis, although the use of coal increased, en-
ergy use in total decreased in West Germany. Economic growth did not 
suffer as perhaps would be thought. Instead, energy use became more 
efficient. Rowlands attributes this fact with the reason why German busi-
nesses were not violently opposed to proposed policies to reduce CO2 
emissions in the late 1980s. He claims that instead these policies were 
seen as being potentially beneficial in terms of efficiency and productivity.  
The need for emissions standards to reduce and control air pollution 
came to the fore when the issue of Waldsterben was discovered and 
made public. As already discussed, this was the catalyst that reinvigorated 
progress in German environmental policies. An example of this reactiva-
tion is given by Weale (1992), who states that following the German gov-
ernment’s change in 1982 to a proactive stance in its environmental out-
look, strict emissions limits with regard to sulphur dioxide and large fur-
naces were implemented in 1983 under the Federal Emission Act. Weale 
goes on to say that Germany has pursued environmental policies such as 
the restriction of vehicle emissions; waste recycling programmes; and 
waste disposal regulations. 
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Members of the Green Party (which had been formed from a social 
movement that had arisen in the 1970s due to popular concern over the 
environment and particularly over nuclear safety2) were voted in to the 
Bundestag (lower house of parliament) in 1983. At the level of the Länder, 
the Green Party was successful in gaining representation in Baden-
Württemberg in 1980; in Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and Hesse in 1982; 
and in Bremen in 1983. In Hesse following the 1985 state elections the 
Green Party and the SPD entered into a coalition and Joschka Fischer 
became the first Green state minister for environmental and energy affairs 
(Mewes, 1998:41). 
These events are significant as they demonstrate that ‘green’ issues 
were a matter of popular concern; this in turn put pressure on other politi-
cal parties to pay attention to environmental matters. An example of the 
results of this pressure is the adoption by the SPD during the 1980s of 
environmental policies that were in large part those already espoused by 
the Green Party. Lees argues that this was done ‘to counter the electoral 
challenge from the Greens’ (Lees, 2002:10). The electoral success of the 
Green Party and the adoption of environmental polices by mainstream po-
litical parties is an example of multi-participatory and inclusive processes 
that can be related to Habermasian decision-making procedures. 
Media coverage of such eventualities as Waldsterben, depletion of the 
ozone layer and global warming are important as they raise public aware-
ness of such issues. If the results of scientific research into environmental 
issues can achieve media attention, this too, clearly feeds into the political 
system. Scientific research is not, however, reliant on media attention as 
Germany has a clear structure for scientific input into the political system. 
Mentioned above was the formation of the Council of Environmental Ex-
perts (SRU) in 1972. Other examples include the Federal Environment 
Agency (UBA) which was established on 22 July 1974, to provide scientific 
and technical support for the Federal Environment Ministry 
(www.bmu.de/english/tasks/uba.htm, October 2001), and the German Ad-
visory Council on Global Change (WBGU) which was established by the 
Federal Government in 1992, immediately before the Rio Conference 
(UNCED). The institutionalised inclusion of scientific experts in the policy-
making debate is another indication that multi-participative decision-
making procedures are in place.  
                                                 
2  For further information see Mayer and Ely (1998) 
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Enquete Commissions also provide expert input to the political proc-
ess. Enquete Commissions are an advisory body to the Federal Govern-
ment. One half of the members are politicians, the other are scientists ap-
pointed by the parties represented in parliament. Enquete Commissions 
are established to give policy advice on complex political issues.  
Beuermann and Jäger hold that the work of the Enquete Commission 
Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre (Preventive measures to protect 
the Earth’s atmosphere), set up in October 1987 was successful and 
shortened the length of time the political process would have taken without 
such input. Following the work of the Enquete Commission and the Fed-
eral Environment Agency (UBA) on 11 December 1991 the Cabinet stated 
that Germany would aim to reduce CO2 emissions by 25-30 per cent by 
the year 2005, based on 1987 values. The Enquete Commission in its 
1990 report had a goal of 30 per cent CO2 emissions reduction.  
As a further reaction to the final report of the first Enquete Commis-
sion in September 1991, the Bundestag agreed strictly to apply the pre-
cautionary and polluter pay principles and to integrate environmental pro-
tection in all political areas (BT.-Drs. 12/1136). This application is stressed 
in every environmental resolution because these principles are the basis 
of German environmental policy since 1971. They are used to explain why 
Germany puts emphasis on the limitation of greenhouse gases and not on 
adaptation research and measures (Beuermann & Jäger, 1996:195). 
As previously noted, one of the principles enshrined in the 1971 Envi-
ronment Programme is that of industry-government cooperation. The con-
sequence of such cooperation is, unsurprisingly, contested. The Director-
ate General XI, Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the 
Commission of the European Communities (1993) holds that close coop-
eration between the various levels of the German government and indus-
trial associations is a positive factor in environmental policy-making, as is 
the involvement of environmental non-governmental organisations. Exam-
ples of such are the Federation of German Industry (BDI) and the German 
Federation for Environment and Nature Protection (DNR). 
The inclusion of industrial associations and environmental non-
governmental organisations in discussions with the German government 
are further indicators of the existence of discursive decision-making proc-
esses. However, Beuermann and Jäger argue out that the Federal Minis-
try for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) is 
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one of the smallest and resource poor ministries, and that the Federal Min-
istries of Economic Affairs; Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; and Trans-
port all make decisions that affect climate change. However, they not only 
represent the German government, they also take into account the inter-
ests of industry and others. BMU does not have such connections but 
stands between all lines: other ministries, industry and environmental 
groups.  
Beuermann & Jäger (1996:195) point out that industrial influence with 
various ministries and inter-ministerial conflict has the effect of weakening 
the environmental policies of the BMU. It could be argued that such gov-
ernmental workings are demonstrative of the consensus oriented nature of 
German politics and comply with Habermas’ contention that all parties 
should be able to partake in discourse. 
A multiplicity of factors, which cannot all be detailed in this paper, 
have influenced the evolution of climate change politics and policies in 
Germany; discursive inclusiveness has allowed ideas and values to be 
taken on board. It can be argued that Germany’s federal system allows for 
multiple viewpoints to be considered and that this has resulted in ‘green’ 
issues becoming mainstream concerns. 
This can be related to Habermas’ ideal of multi-participative discourse 
being engaged in that results in consensus being reached through the 
force of the better argument. It has also been argued that the enshrining in 
law of the environmental principles contained in the 1971 Environment 
Programme, i.e. precautionary measures, polluter-pays principle, and in-
dustry-government cooperation, is akin to the process identified by 
Habermas in which generalisable interests become universal norms. The 
adoption of environmental concerns by mainstream political parties has 
led to effective domestic environmental policy-making, which has subse-
quently allowed Germany to become a leader in climate change politics. 
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3. Germany and the European Union 
The European Union (EU) is not the focus of this study. However, Ger-
many is a member of the EU and as such works within the framework of 
the EU. At international negotiations the Member States of the EU pre-
agree a unified position that is presented by the EU delegation. It is, there-
fore, necessary to consider the relations between Germany and the EU.  
In the 1957 Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic 
Community (EEC), there was no mention of the environment, and there-
fore, no specific authority for environmental policies to be introduced. 
Nevertheless, over a number of years it became apparent that damage to 
the environment and environmental protection needed to be considered. 
At the Paris Summit in 1972, ministers decided that the Community should 
take measures to address environmental issues. 
It is worth noting that in 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment was held in Stockholm at which time there was much activity in 
environmental politics. Germany had introduced its first Federal Environ-
ment Programme in 1971. As an important member of EEC and as envi-
ronmental policy-making had taken a major step forward in its domestic 
politics, Germany was proactive in encouraging the EEC to take action 
with regard to the environment. Von Seht and Ott (2000) argue that Ger-
man environmental policy was in many cases the starting point of EU/EEC 
environmental policy. Germany introduced environmental protection legis-
lation earlier than other EU/EEC countries. This resulted in calls from 
German business for conditions of equal competition. They demanded that 
competitors in other Member States should be subject to the same envi-
ronmental requirements and thus the same presumed costs (von Seht & 
Ott, 2000:5)3. 
Much of Germany’s environmental policy-making has resulted from a 
discursively inclusive process. The above argument points to discourse 
continuing to be important in the transfer of environmental policy-making 
to the European level, i.e. Germany business communities entered into 
discourse regarding the need to prevent themselves being put at an eco-
nomic disadvantage. Calls for EU/EEC legislation on the environment 
would undoubtedly have also come from actors promoting environmental 
                                                 
3  Schleicher, 1997:44 is referenced in von Seht & Ott’s work. 
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awareness and protection for the environment’s sake, thus resulting in 
multi-participative discourse. 
Previously mentioned was the catalytic effect that Waldsterben had on 
German domestic environmental politics in the early 1980s. This trans-
ferred to Germany’s efforts in Europe where they pushed for air pollution 
policies to be introduced. Anderson and Liefferink (1997:26) argue that 
Germany’s efforts were aided by the appointment of a German Environ-
ment Commissioner, Karl-Heinz Narjes and Germany holding the Presi-
dency of the Council in the first half of 1983, which had the effect of expe-
diting a final proposal of an acidification policy that the Commission was in 
the process of preparing. Anderson and Liefferink point out that at this 
time the Third Environmental Action Programme was approved which 
placed more importance on the separation of environmental issues from 
trade concerns than previous programmes had done. 
A similar argument is made by Economy and Schreurs (1997) who 
cite the success of the Green Party in Germany, and the subsequent up-
take of green issues by mainstream political parties arguing that this train 
of events continued on to the European level where Germany became a 
“primary force” in pushing the European Community on the introduction of 
a Large Combustion Plant Directive and later in the cases of stratospheric 
ozone depletion and global climate change (Economy and Schreurs, 
1997:9).  
Anderson and Liefferink state that ‘Germany became known as the 
‘engine’ of EU environmental policy in the 1980s’ (1997:26). Reasons 
given for this are: Germany’s domestic policies; the economic importance 
of the German market; and ‘the more intentional pusher role of the Ger-
man government’ (ibid). 
Although EEC environmental policy-making became established in the 
1970s and 1980s, it was not until the Single European Act amended the 
Treaty of Rome in 1987 that express authority for an environmental policy 
was provided, thus effectively legitimizing the extensive body of environ-
mental legislation that had by then been adopted under a rather elastic 
interpretation of the original Treaty (Haigh, 1996:159). 
Clearly, the Member States of the EEC had agreed on the general de-
velopment of environmental policies; the de facto existence of such poli-
cies eventually leading to their legitimisation and the right to introduce fu-
ture policies.  
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The Single European Act decrees that a number of environmental 
principles be followed. These principles determine that preventive action 
should be taken to avoid environmental degradation; that environmental 
damage be addressed at source as a matter of urgency; that the polluter 
should pay; that environmental protection requirements be incorporated 
within other EEC policies; and that the principle of subsidiarity should ap-
ply. This latter principle means that action should be taken by the EEC 
only where the required objectives can be better achieved by the EEC 
than by Member States acting alone.  
On 1st November 1993, the Treaty on European Union (otherwise 
known as the Maastricht Treaty) came into effect. The treaty strengthened 
the requirement for environmental protection to be integrated both in defi-
nition and in the implementation of other policies, i.e. that the environment 
must be considered in all policy-making, not only that which is purely envi-
ronmental. The environmental principles that were enshrined in the Single 
European Act were supplemented by the addition of the precautionary 
principle. Germany actively promoted its adoption.  
It is pertinent to mention that the precautionary principle is not one 
that sits easily with all countries of the EU. As Wurzel (2002) explains, a 
standard setting philosophy in Britain is the requirement for scientific proof. 
This fact indicates that for the precautionary principle to be adopted by the 
EU required discourse through which agreement was reached by the force 
of the better argument. The preventive principle and the precautionary 
principle may seem to be similar; the difference being that one can take 
preventive action if an outcome is expected, i.e. known to be an end prod-
uct of a particular action or series of actions. The precautionary principle 
can be explained as requiring consideration of what outcomes may occur 
as a result of an action or series of actions and to take precautions accord-
ingly. 
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4. The European Union and International Relations 
The EU presents a united position at global conferences such as the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) and at climate change 
specific international negotiations such as those held annually by the Con-
ference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The European Community (EC)4 (represented by the 
Directorate General for the Environment) and the EU Member States at-
tend such conferences. But it is the ‘troika’, which consists of the current 
EU Presidency, the incoming Presidency and the European Commission, 
that negotiates on behalf of all Member States. The presiding EU Presi-
dency presents the pre-agreed united position. Speaking with ‘one voice’ 
gives the EU a strong bargaining position in terms of it representing a 
large power bloc. 
In 2004, in addition to the fifteen Member States, it has usually been 
the case that the ten European States that became EU members in May 
2004 have also backed the EU position. A bloc of twenty-five countries 
that are presenting a unified argument have a greater chance of influenc-
ing events than does any individual European State acting alone. It can be 
argued that without the proactivity of the EU following the withdrawal of the 
USA from the Kyoto Protocol, it is likely that the Protocol would have com-
pletely collapsed. Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Japan, the EC and 
the EU Member States has meant that when Russia ratified the Protocol 
on 18 November 2004, the required ratification by 55 parties to the con-
vention making up at least 55% of 1990 emissions of Annex 1 parties (in-
dustrialised countries) has occurred. The Kyoto Protocol therefore entered 
into force on 16 February 2005. 
There are, however, some disadvantages of ‘speaking with one voice’. 
Whilst the bargaining position of the EU as a bloc is enhanced in terms of 
pure power, flexibility suffers as does the ability to network, which would 
enable greater understanding of the positions of others and the chance to 
                                                 
4  The EU consists of three pillars, which are the EC, Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, and Home Affairs and Justice Policy. Whilst it is common practice to use the 
term EU when talking or writing about European law, it is in fact the case that it is 
only the EC that has legal identity. Therefore, the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol were signed and ratified by the 
EC and the Member States. 
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let others know and understand one’s own position and perhaps gain in-
fluence through reasonable and just argument. 
Some elucidation regarding the comment about flexibility is required. 
Prior to international negotiations, EU members agree on a unified stance. 
During international conferences EU coordination meetings are held at the 
start of each day so that the EU Member States can keep up to date with 
events and agree on a unified position. Coordination meetings can be, and 
are often, held during the course of the day to ensure that the EU ‘one 
voice’ keeps apace with developments. When discussions move on a tan-
gent that was not expected, the EU tends to be left out of the ongoing de-
bate whilst the EU Member States gather to talk about the new situation in 
order to come to some agreement amongst themselves before returning to 
the bargaining table. Thus, the EU can be rather slow at international ne-
gotiations. 
This situation is likely to be exacerbated now EU enlargement has oc-
curred. Negotiators involved in these meetings are themselves aware of 
these shortcomings and are looking at ways to circumvent such problems. 
It could be argued that whilst discussions occurring between EU Member 
States in order to reach agreement may fit within Habermas’ discourse 
ethics framework, that when this occurs repeatedly it hinders the fulfilling 
of universally inclusive ethical discourse between the wider international 
community. 
It is worth mentioning the argument put forward by Schelling (1960:29) 
that when a bargaining process has a time limit and there is seen to be 
inflexibility on the part of an actor that this can in fact work as an incentive 
to others to agree on a position near to that put forward by the inflexible 
actor.  
The second disadvantage identified above, is the restricted time spent 
networking due to discussions being held among EU Member States. In 
an interview with a senior member of the German delegation, what has 
been termed networking in this paper was called outreach. It was stated 
that this problem has been recognised and that at recent meetings it had 
been decided to maximise outreach by allocating certain areas to the most 
appropriate EU Member States. For example, France had the task of talk-
ing to representatives from francophone Africa, and Britain to Indian rep-
resentatives. Germany is active in promoting outreach talks. 
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In order to arrive at a unified EU position prior to international negotia-
tions, delegations from Member States meet regularly with representatives 
of the European Commission (from the Directorate General for the Envi-
ronment). Normal practice is for meetings of the ‘working party on interna-
tional environmental issues – climate change’ to be held approximately 
monthly. Additionally, expert groups are held to look into specific issue 
areas; these expert groups are initiated by, and report back to, the working 
party. Member States can appoint an expert to attend these groups and to 
accompany governmental representatives to conferences. In addition to 
the monthly meetings, at the start of each Presidency (January and July) a 
meeting is held that lasts for about three days. These meetings combine 
work and the reinforcing of working relationships; it is a time when informal 
ideas can be talked about. It is also the case that at least some of the 
people working on climate change within the various countries and the 
European Commission have built up a close working relationship with one 
another and that communication is ongoing between various parties. 
In addition to the working party on climate change there is a ‘working 
party on international issues – sustainable development’. Just as Ger-
many’s climate change policies have evolved over a number of years so 
have those of the EU. Continuing discourse exists between the Member 
States with the aim of reaching a unified position. Germany may be influ-
enced and also influence these discussions, but the end result is that there 
is largely a confluence of positions. 
Germany actively participates in the evolution of environmental policy 
within the EU. The very nature of the EU, with Member States regularly 
meeting to discuss environmental issues in order to reach a united posi-
tion can be related to Habermas’ requirements for ethical discourse. That 
said some of the reasons cited for Germany’s influence, i.e. monetary con-
tributions and market importance do not fit within the framework of the 
force of the better argument prevailing. However, the fact that existing 
policies within Germany give credibility to the German position can be re-
lated to this framework, as if a policy is already seen to be working effi-
ciently then one could say that this is indicative of the best argument. The 
fact that Germany actively participates in all meetings and is keen to enter 
into discussions with all parties also fits within the requirements for ethical 
discourse.  
It has been argued that Germany is influential with regard to EU cli-
mate change policies. It should be noted that if a policy is backed by the 
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EU, it reinforces the BMU’s argument within Germany. There is reflexivity 
between German and EU policies and aims.  
Not all of Germany’s aims have been taken up by the EU. One of the 
features of decisions reached through multi-participative discursive proc-
esses can be that where true consensus is not achieved compromise is 
needed. In order to arrive at the united position that the EU presents at 
international negotiations, the EU Member States have to negotiate – and 
to varying degrees they have to compromise. 
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5. Conclusions 
At the beginning of this paper it was stated that from a Habermasian point 
of view one might expect German climate change related policies to be the 
result of rational decision-making arrived at through discourse that in-
cludes a multiplicity of inputs and considerations. To an extent, this can be 
seen to be true. Discussion in this paper shows that Germany’s political 
system allows for multi-participative discourse to be considered in the pol-
icy-making process. Policies that are the outcomes of this process are 
then taken forward onto the international arena. As has been shown in the 
section on Germany and the EU, Germany has had some success in in-
fluencing EU policy5.  
Once negotiations take place between nations, whether this be within 
the EU or at the truly international level, there is a discursive imperative 
through which consensus needs to be found in order for any agreement 
and progress to be made. The use of Habermas’ discourse ethics has 
greater relevance than providing a framework for the analysis in this pa-
per. It can lead to greater understanding of how interests are formed and 
legitimised; facilitate analysis of actions taken; and provide a framework 
through which just and implementable decisions can be reached.  
The discursive nature of climate change international relations and the 
need to find common agreement for the future direction of global climate 
change related policies indicates that the implementation of discourse eth-
ics as propounded by Habermas would be beneficial. Agreements reached 
through discourse where participatory justice has been implemented are 
more likely to be acceptable to all parties, and thus the prospects for suc-
cessful implementation will be greater. 
 
                                                 
5  Germany has also had some influence with regard to truly international policy; see 
Jaggard (2005). 
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